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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRICKEN DEFENDANTS' 
OPPOSITION. 
A. Defendants' Filing Was Timely. 
In Appellee's Brief, she argues that the trial court was correct in striking 
Appellants' opposition to the motion for summary judgment, because the response was 
required to be "filed" and not "served". It is undisputed the opposition memorandum was 
served in a timely fashion. The issue then becomes whether an opposition pleading 
served on time but filed with the clerk one day late is timely under the Rules. 
To make this determination the Rules of Civil Procedure must be reads as a whole. 
Appellants, in their brief, pointed the Court to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Appellee did not respond to the argument under Rule 5. 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs "SERVICE AND FILING 
OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS". The rule requires service on the attorneys of 
all parties represented by counsel in the matter. Rule 5(b)(1)(B) provides, in pertinent 
part, "Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending." Service in this matter 
was made on March 10, 2008 as required. Rule 5 goes on to state "All papers after the 
complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or 
within a reasonable time after service." URCP Rule 5(d). 
The opposition memorandum is a paper required to be served after the complaint. 
According to Rule 5 if service was accomplished within the required time strictures, the 
actual filing needed to be made only "within a reasonable time after service." The 
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opposition memorandum was filed on March 11, 2008. Clearly one day is within the 
Rules stricture of reasonableness. 
Appellants provided case law authority in support of their position, Appellee did 
not respond to the case authority cited by Appellants, nor did she provide any case 
authority supporting her own position. See e.g. Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah 
1976) (A motion which "was filed wilhin two days after service comports with the 
reasonable time requirement of Rule 5(d), U.R.C.P.") 
B. Striking Defendants9 Opposition Was An Abuse Of Discretion. 
In Appellants' Brief, they set forth the applicable standard of review and case 
authority reflecting the purposes of the rules of civil procedure and apply the standards 
and authority to the facts of this case. 
In response Appellee cites only one case, which simply reiterates the standard of 
review, already identified by the Appellants, and then states that because the "filing" was 
not made within the ten days under the rule, the court cannot be said to have abused its 
discretion. In making her argument the Appellee ignores all of the case law cited by 
Appellants which identify the disfavor the courts typically have toward remedies that 
deprive litigants of their day in court. They further ignore all of the authority that sets 
forth the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In short Appellee asks this court to uphold a ruling allowing a hyper technical 
reading of the rules, meant only to give litigants fair opportunities to be heard, to deprive 
the Appellants of their day in court. Such an application of the rules in this case is a clear 
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abuse of discretion. 
C. Striking The Opposition Was Not Harmless Error. 
Appellee argues that even if the trial court's striking of Appellants' opposition was 
an abuse of discretion, it is irrelevant because the error was harmless. In support of this 
theory Appellant cites to the case of Albrecht v. Bennett, 44 P.3d 838 (Utah App. 2002). 
The Albrecht case has no relevancy to the case before this court. In Albrecht, the 
Plaintiff had filed a motion to dismiss her complaint against the Defendants. The 
Defendants had filed a motion for summary judgment against the Plaintiff. The trial 
court granted the Plaintiffs motion to dismiss and made the dismissal with prejudice. 
On appeal Plaintiff argued the dismissal should have been without prejudice. The 
Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling holding that the trial court would have 
undoubtedly have granted the summary judgment motion, if it had decided to not dismiss 
with prejudice and therefore "any error on the part of the trial court in dismissing 
Albrecht's complaint with prejudice, if one exists, was harmless error that would not 
have changed the ultimate outcome." Albrecht at 844. 
Contrary to Appellee's assertion, allowing the opposition of the Appellant does 
impact the ultimate outcome. It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on 
the other side of a controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. 
Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P 2d. 191 (1975). In her brief, Appellee states : 
"Advantage and Turner's Brief only contested one of Dean's statements of fact." Brief of 
Appellee pg. 12. The one fact that Appellee admits was disputed was whether there was 
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any consideration for the 2007 agreement. That fact is central to the Appellants' defense. 
Acceptance of that disputed fact, as required by URCP Rule 56, requires denial of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
If the motion striking the opposition memo is allowed to stand, the Appellants are 
not able to rely on their proper refutation of the Appellee's affidavit and must instead 
rely upon the fact that the Appellee failed to support her allegations by affidavit, thus 
allowing the Appellants to rely on their pleadings in refutation, While, in this instance 
Appellants believe this Court will find this to be the case, the court need not even get to 
that point if the opposition memorandum is reinstated. 
D. Appellants' Claim That The Trial Court Erred In Striking Their Opposition 
Memorandum Is Not Moot. 
Appellee argues that the issue of whether the trial court improperly struck 
Appellants' opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment is moot. The alleged 
basis for this argument is a finding within the trial court's memorandum decision wherein 
the court stated "even if the Court were to consider the Defendants' opposition, however, 
the Plaintiff would still be entitled to summary judgment on her claim for breach of 
contract." R.71-72. 
As shown in section I.C. above, even if this was the trial court's opinion as to what 
the correct determination would have been, the standards for review on appeal are 
different. The Appellant believes the trial court erred both in it's decision to strike and 
on its determination that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because 
the standards for review are different, the issue of whether the trial court erred in 
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dismissing the opposition is not moot. 
II. THE "AGREEMENT" IS NOT AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. 
A. Plaintiff Gave No Consideration For The "AGREEMENT". 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must "view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 Utah 2004). This rule of law appears 
to have been skipped in the trial court's ruling and Appellee's analysis. 
The undisputed facts are that a verbal contract was entered into between the 
Plaintiff and Advantage Title Company in 2004. The contract required the plaintiff to 
transfer a condominium in Park City to Advantage and for Advantage to cure arrearages 
on the plaintiffs loan and to make the payments on the loan thereafter. The property was 
transferred, the arrearage was satisfied, and Advantage made the payments on the 
mortgage through April of 2008. 
A written Agreement was entered in August of 2007 between the original parties 
to the 2004 contract and Shawn D. Turner. The Agreement stated it was effective 
8/15/07. It was executed at the end of August 2007. It required Advantage to pay the 
loan by the end of September 2007. It required Advantage to pay Barbee up to $1,000.00 
for attorney fees for negotiating the Agreement. It required Advantage to pay penalties of 
$1,000.00 per month if the loan was not paid in full by September 30, 2008. It required 
Shawn Turner to guaranty Advantage's performance under the Agreement. 
On their face, these facts support the Defendants' contention that there were two 
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separate agreements and as consideration for the second agreement the Plaintiff gave 
nothing. The sole recited consideration was the transfer of the property to Advantage, but 
that transfer had already taken place three years previously in return for the promises 
Advantage made at that time. 
To avoid the obvious truth of this matter, the Plaintiff manufactured a theory 
unplead in her Complaint and unsupported by her affidavit filed in support of her motion 
for summary judgment. That theory is that the 2007 Agreement was a mere 
memorialization of the 2004 agreement of the parties. Adoption of this theory is directly 
contrary to the rule that the court "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004). 
Where the party making the motion does not support his or her motion with 
competent sworn testimony or other admissible evidence, the party opposing the motion 
is entitled to rely on his contradictory pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975). Plaintiff did not provide any sworn testimony that the 2007 
Agreement was a mere memorialization of the 2004 contract. Defendants are 
accordingly entitled to rely on their Answer wherein they raised the affirmative defense 
of a failure of consideration, which was based on the existence of two separate 
agreements. 
It is undisputed, or at worst there is a dispute that must be interpreted in the 
Defendants' favor, that there were two separate contracts. If it is accepted there were two 
6 
contracts then there was not any consideration for the promises of Advantage or Turner in 
the 2007 Agreement, therefore the Agreement consists solely of gratuitous promises and 
it is not an enforceable contract. 
B. Plaintiff Cannot Raise A Claim Of Additional Consideration. 
1. The claim of additional consideration is being raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
In her brief Plaintiff, for the first time, claims that there was alternative 
consideration for the 2007 agreement in the form of forbearance of suing on the 2004 
agreement. This argument is not made in the complaint, nor was it raised before the trial 
court in the pleadings relating to the summary judgment. "Issues not raised before the 
district court are normally waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 
Gardner v. Bd. Of County Comm Vs., 178 P.3d 893, 902 (Utah 2008). This court should 
accordingly not address Plaintiffs claim of alternative consideration. 
2. No additional consideration was provided. 
If this court were to consider the new claim of the Plaintiff that she provided 
consideration through a forbearance of suit on the 2004 agreement, there still would be 
no valid consideration. With respect to Turner, he was not a party to the 2004 agreement 
and therefore there could have been no forbearance with respect to a claim against him. 
With respect to Advantage, the recitations in the 2007 Agreement establish that 
Advantage had fully performed its obligations under the 2004 agreement, through the 
time the 2007 Agreement was made. There was no valid claim to be made under the 
original contract and accordingly any forbearance was illusory and could not constitute 
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consideration. 
C. The 2007 Agreement Did Not Constitute An Accord And Satisfaction 
Like the claim of alternative consideration, the claim of an accord and satisfaction was 
not plead to the trial court and should not be considered on appeal. .Gardner v. Bd. Of 
County Comm frs., 178 P.3d 893, 902 (Utah 2008). 
Summary Judgment is only available where there are no disputed issues of 
material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P 2d. 64 (1984). Only where it clearly appears 
that the party against whom the judgment would be granted can't possible establish a 
right to recover should summary judgment be granted, and any doubt should be resolved 
in favor of such a party when summary judgment against him is being considered. 
Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah 
2d. 211, 398 P 2d. 685 (1965). In considering a motion, the court must "view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004). It only takes 
one sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of a controversy and create an 
issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P 2d. 
191 (1975). Where the party making the motion does not support his or her motion with 
competent sworn testimony or other admissible evidence, the party opposing the motion 
is entitled to rely on his contradictory pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975). 
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The Plaintiffs Complaint and the Court's Memorandum decision make it clear 
that no consideration was given for the 2007 "Agreement". The Court skirts this issue by 
declaring that the 2007 Agreement is simply a memorialization of the 2004 Agreement. 
In its Memorandum Decision the court states: 
The sole argument presented by the Defendants in opposing the motion is that the 
Agreement is unenforceable for lack of consideration. They note that the Plaintiff 
has only identified the transfer of the Property as consideration for the Agreement. 
They argue, however that the transfer "occurred in 2004 and was in return for 
Advantage's promises to make the mortgage payment (which Plaintiff, in the 
Agreement, admits had been made through August of 2007)." (Memo in 
Opposition, at 2). In other words, the Defendants appear to contend that the 2007 
Agreement is separate from the 2004 exchange. 
The Plaintiff counters that the 2007 Agreement is merely a memorialization of the 
contract entered into in 2004. The Court agrees. Nothing in the Agreement 
suggests that it represents a new obligation. 
R.72-73. 
In its ruling the Court has explicitly violated the strictures of Rule 56. Instead of 
viewing the facts and their inferences in the light most favorable to the Defendants, it has 
instead created inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. The Court 
recognized that Defendants claim the 2007 Agreement and the 2004 contract are separate, 
but accepts the assertion of the Plaintiff that the 2007 Agreement is just a 
memorialization. A simple examination of the facts shows the Court's interpretation is in 
error. 
The Agreement itself states that it is "effective as of August 15, 2007". The 2007 
Agreement includes Shawn Turner as a party whereas the 2004 contract did not. The 
allegations of the Complaint state "10. On or about August 31, 2007, Barbee entered into 
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an agreement with Advantage Title and Turner (the "Agreement")." There is nothing in 
the affidavit of the Plaintiff submitted with her Memorandum in Support of her Motion 
for summary judgment that states the 2007 Agreement was simply a memorialization. In 
short the Court has taken the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and not the 
Defendant. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling is in error and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion was timely or in 
the alternative the defect was of such negligible magnitude that the trial court's striking 
of the opposition constituted an abuse of discretion. In either event the opposition should 
be allowed. 
Whether the opposition is allowed or not, the plaintiff failed to provide sworn 
testimony rebutting the presumption made in defendants' Answer that the 2007 
Agreement was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration. The trial court's 
acceptance of the plaintiffs position that the 2007 Agreement is simply a 
memorialization of the prior 2004 Contract is directly contrary to the evidence and 
certainly was not made interpreting the evidence in the favor of the party fighting the 
motion. If the issue cannot be decided in the defendants' favor, as a matter of law, it at 
least results in the creation of an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2008 
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LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON 
/ /) ^r - "" 
/ / 
Shawn D. Turner 
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